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The economic literature of property rights has been assessing the impact of different 
community based arrangements on the efficiency of natural resource management of specific 
areas.  Differently, other strands of development economics and policy-oriented research have 
been concerned with issues such as poverty alleviation, technological progress and the 
capability to compete in market economies, which go beyond the local areas where traditional 
communities live and include the wider economy. The extractive reserves in the Brazilian 
Amazon offer perhaps one of the most interesting cases for investigating the connections 
between these two approaches in the context of tropical forests. It is based on the idea that the 
combination of public property with collective use in particular forest areas can generate 
competitive and, at the same time, sustainable exploitation of its natural resources. This paper 
aims to analyse whether the existing property rights support the joint objective of 
conservation and development. Our main result is that current property rights systems are 
efficient only with respect to competition in markets for existing extractive products. This 
finding points out to a fundamental contradiction between the static structure of the property 
rights systems and the dynamic nature of two most promising development paths, namely the 
discovery of new products and the supply of biological inputs for plantations. The current 
model of extractive reserves based on the design of internal property rights fails to taken into 
account the broader economic context where the reserves must generate a viable revenue 
stream. We conclude therefore that under the current set of institutions, the development 
objectives inherent in the extractive reserves model are likely to face probably considerable 
challenges to be accomplished in the future. 
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Since the seminal work by Hardin (1968), the role of property rights for balancing 
the conservation-development trade-off has been discussed in the economic literature. 
The research on property rights has been mainly concerned with the assessment of 
different community based arrangements in promoting efficient management of natural 
resources. In several studies a particular emphasis has been placed on property rights 
internal to the study area or the theoretically conceived community area (Baland and 
Platteau, 1996; Bardhan, 1993; Seabright, 1993; Ostrom, 1990).  
However, economic theory and empirical evidence provide mixed insights 
regarding the adequacy of choosing between private property, public ownership or 
communal property as optimal resource management systems (Baland and Plateau, 1996; 
Seabright, 1993). Indeed both approaches show that it is not possible to rule out situations 
where none of the single alternatives individually provides a viable solution. A natural 
response to the difficulty of choosing a single property right regime can be found in 
combinations of ‘pure’ categories, i.e. by building the so-called co-managed systems. It 
can be argued that in particular, the combination of state-based with community-based 
modes of regulation might be effective in reducing informational asymmetries and 
monitoring costs (Baland and Plateau, 1996). An added benefit is that the government 
can provide legal frameworks enabling rural organizations to claim their rights against 
external intruders. Finally, co-management systems can avoid resistance from the 
communities with respect to regulations coming from the central government. 
While the property rights literature has been mainly focused on optimal resource 
management within specific areas, other strands of development economics and policy-
oriented research have been concerned with broader development issues (see Sadoulet 
and de Janvry, 1995 and Bardhan and Udry, 1999 for an introduction). For the latter, 
questions regarding poverty alleviation, technological progress and the capability to  
  1
compete in market economies pose challenges that go beyond the local areas where 
traditional communities live and include the wider economy (Angelsen, 1999; Lipton and 
Ravallion, 1995; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Keller, 1996; 
Rodriguez, 1996). The interface of these two bodies of research becomes important when 
traditional communities managing complex natural resources interact to the outside world 
by trading products. The need to remain competitive in a market economy where 
heterogeneous players operate with different production systems creates an inexorable 
link between internal property rights and wider development processes. Traditional 
communities must be able not only to manage their resources optimally but also to 
improve their production systems and technologies, offering products at competitive 
prices and deriving comparative advantages. 
The extractive reserves in the Brazilian Amazon offer perhaps one of the most 
interesting cases for investigating the interface between property rights and development 
in the context of tropical forests. In these reserves, the combination of public property, 
community management and private resource use of designated forest areas are expected 
to generate competitive and, at the same time, sustainable extraction of non-wood forest 
products (NWFP)
 1 . Therefore, not only the internal property rights assigned to the 
reserve matter but also the broad set of property rights upon the wider economy is 
structured. 
In their first 10 years of existence the extractive reserves have been attracted the 
attention and investments of a number of institutions and have been considered by some 
as an important element for a development strategy to the region (Allegretti, 1990, 1994; 
Menezes, 1994). Nevertheless, the economic reality of these reserves poses serious 
doubts and motivates scepticism about their capacity to fulfil its economic development 
objectives (Southgate, 1998; Brown and Rosendo, 2000; Assies, 1997; Almeida, 1994; 
Homma, 1992; Goeschl and Igliori, 2003). Only a very limited number of products are 
commercially exploited so far and the majority of their population remains poor. The 
threat posed by cultivated substitutes is eminent and the extraction of NWFP still depends 
on external support. 
                                                           
1 For a discussion on the creation of the extractive reserves, see Allegretti (1990). For a description of the 
main features of extractive reserves and their current status see Brown and Rosendo (2000), and Goeschl 
and Igliori (2003).  
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Building on previous research on the spatial economics of extractive reserves 
(Goeschl and Igliori 2004), this paper investigates the relationship between property right 
regimes and the development perspectives of extractive reserves to contribute to the 
bodies of literature above-mentioned. To do so, we first explore three possible 
development pathways that the extractive reserves production system can pursue. We 
then confront these pathways with the property rights in place both within and outside the 
reserves in order to assess the capacity of these property rights to support each of the 
development pathways. 
Our main result is a negative one: The current system of property rights properly 
supports only one of three principal development pathways, namely the extraction of 
established NWFP. We argue that this development pathway has very limited capacity to 
serve as a growth engine for the communities living in extractive reserves. On the other 
hand, the current property rights structure generates no or very limited rents for the inputs 
required to access the other two pathways, diversification into newly discovered NWFP 
and supply of biological inputs into the intensive production of NWFP.  
These findings point to a fundamental tension between the static structure of the 
internal property rights system and the dynamic nature of the two more promising 
development paths. The current model of extractive reserves, based on the design of 
internal property rights, fails to take into account the broader economic context where the 
reserves must generate a viable revenue stream. We conclude therefore that under the 
current set of institutions, the development objectives inherent in the extractive reserves 
model are likely to face probably insurmountable challenges. 
This problematic conclusion has implications for policy-making and provides 
material for further research. On the one hand our analysis suggests that policies aiming 
to enable indigenous communities to develop viably should go beyond the design of 
internal property rights and address the issues regarding the ways these communities 
interact economically with the outside world. On the other, the results also indicate that 
there is a clear need for further research exploring in greater detail the link between 
internal property right systems and broader development strategies rather than merely the 
optimal management of a given resource.  
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The paper is structured in four sections. The following section characterises the 
NWFP production and explores the long run perspectives of extractive reserves through 
its alternative development pathways. The analysis of property rights internal and 
external to extractive reserves is the topic of the third section. The fourth section 
discusses to what extent these property rights are conducive to alternative development 
pathways. We then summarise and conclude. 
 
 
2. NWFP Production and Development Pathways 
 
Capital Stock and Cost Dynamics 
 
In this section we characterize the main features of NWFP production systems. To 
capture the peculiarities of the NWFP production, Goeschl and Igliori (2003) developed a 
dynamic model of spatial competition between an extractive reserve and a plantation. 
Here we discuss the motivations underlining the model and its main results without going 
into the mathematical set up and propositions. 
The production of NWFP involves the harvesting of products generated by trees 
or shrubs. This makes clear that the production process relies on an underlying stock of 
biological capital. This capital stock differs from the standard physical capital used in 
conventional production systems in that the composition and size of the capital stock are 
directly linked to the rate of capital depreciation. Take the rubber tree as an example. 
Prior to the development of rubber plantations in Brazil, incidence of leaf blight was 
limited due to genetic variability in natural tree populations from which rubber was 
extracted. Early rubber plantations using intensive methods were devastated by the 
impact of leaf blight epidemics that made Brazilian rubber permanently uncompetitive on 
world markets while South-East Asian plantations evaded the disease through mere 
serendipity at the time when rubber saplings were smuggle out of South America 
(Kloppenburg, 1988). In all, there are about 90 species of fungi known to attack Hevea 
trees, two species of bacteria, and various nematode and insect pests (Duke, 1983). These 
pathogens seriously impact on the costs of intensive production development since they  
  4
require continuous investment into the protection of the biological capital base, mostly 
significantly through breeding (Goncalves, 2000; IRRDB, 1998; Rubber Board, 2002). 
On the other hand, intensive production in plantations benefits in a static sense from 
lower harvesting costs and in a dynamic sense from productivity gains in complementary 
inputs (physical capital, human capital) driven by technological progress and knowledge 
(FAO, 1995). 
The general dynamics of an industry dependent on a biological resource stock 
imply that production costs of a NWFP producing enterprise  will vary over time 
depending on the productivity of its capital stock:  The productivity of the biological 
capital stock will be negatively affected by increases in the size of production that can be 
mitigated through simultaneous investments in biological resources. A conventional 
enterprise will be able to optimally choose price and output as well as the path of its 
production technology.  
By contrast, extractive reserves combine a severe restriction with regard to the 
choice of production technology with an abundance of biological capital. With respect to 
NWFP production, extractive reserves are peculiar because not the community, but the 
government is the owner of the biological capital stock. It grants the community free use 
of that stock subject to that stock not being depreciated. Implicit in this use condition is 
also a restriction of the production technology that limits the marginal productivity of 
physical capital (Browder, 1992). These restrictions together with the intrinsic difficulties 
in operating within the forest, low capital intensity, little access to capital and the 
persistence of traditional methods suggest that the depreciation of the biological capital 
stock in NWFP production in reserves is negligible. Conversely, the rate of cost reduction 
driven an existing physical capital stock will be extremely low in the reserves because 
labour intensive production involves little physical capital. With this configuration, the 
cost dynamics are not relevant to the intertemporal management of an extractive reserve. 
What will matter for the profitability of NWFP production, however, is that the level of 
unit costs will be at a level commensurate with the constrained production conditions in 
the reserve. 
While constrained in the choice of technology, the abundance of biological capital 
means that extractive reserves have direct and inexpensive access to a critical input in the  
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NWFP production process. This stock potentially allows a diversification of NWFP 
production into the various extractive activities (rubber, nuts, fruits, oils, fibres) thus 
reducing the reliance on each individual product. It also opens up the interesting 
perspective of extractive reserve potentially benefiting from the demand for biological 
inputs from other NWFP producing enterprises subject to cost dynamics. This demand 
could be met in accordance with the use restrictions as long as the reserve can supply 
these inputs at a price lower than the cost of bioprospecting to the enterprises.  
The peculiar production conditions in the extractive reserves present both a set of 
constraints for each NWFP production process by virtue of not being able to choose the 
first-best technology and a set of opportunities through the free access to an abundant 
biological capital stock that allows both diversification of output and sale of biological 
inputs. In terms of biodiversity conservation, these production conditions have clear 
benefits as they secure land use rights for activities that do not rely on land conversion. 
Economically, these conditions represent a significant improvement in terms of social 
equity compared to the traditional ‘aviamento’ system of rubber ‘barons’ and quasi-
indentured labour
2. However, it is less clear whether this constrained production system 
offers viable pathways to development through sustainable income flows for their 
populations.  
 
Markets for Existing NWFP 
 
NWFP enterprises generate revenue through sale of their products on markets 
where they interact with other producers of NWFP. Following Goeschl and Igliori (2003) 
we focus on two peculiar features of this market for NWFP: The first is the spatial 
structure of enterprise location in the NWFP sector. Due to the considerable distance 
involved in the domestic market and resultant transportation costs, space is an important 
determinant of the profitability of operations. At the same time, production depends on 
peculiar local characteristics that are not present everywhere, thus limiting the choice of 
production sites. The second peculiar feature is the heterogeneity of enterprises 
competing on the market. What is expected of extractive reserves is that they are able to 
                                                           
2 See Allegretti 1994 and Brwon and Rosendo for a discussion of this tradional system.  
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generate revenue on output markets where they will be competing with other producers 
that are operating using different technological choices and resource bases.  
 
The combination of spatial considerations and producer heterogeneity is not only 
analytically interesting, it is also empirically relevant: Extractive reserves and potential 
plantations are usually localised in different parts of the country (in rubber production 
most of the plantations are localised in the South East of the country). Wunder (1999) 
shows that NWFP production outside extractive reserves is very concentrated and 18 
municipalities account for 25 per cent of the total extraction values.
3 These product belts 
are mostly characterised by proximity to market areas and by previous intervention or 
degradation in current sites of extraction. These environments are now dominated by the 
commercial species, sometimes up to the point of forming ‘quasi-plantations’, as a 
consequence of natural re-growth combined with management practices to deliberately 
eliminate competitive vegetation (Wunder 1999).  
Goeschl and Igliori (2003) show that, given the constrained production 
conditions, the development of the market share for extractive reserves even under most 
favourable assumptions, is likely to lead to a declining revenue stream. This is on account 
of the unconstrained producer being able to reduce costs through investment. This 
investment is justified because it allows the producer to capture a higher market share 
from the reserve in the spatially differentiated market. If eventually the cost difference 
reaches a threshold the low cost firm takes over the whole market. This implies that there 
is only a limited time period over which production of a NWFP will generate significant 
revenues for the reserve. This limitation is exacerbated by the fact that the more revenue 
potential that product has, the greater are the incentives for the unconstrained producer to 
reduce costs quickly, and consequently the shorter the time period of profitable operation 
for the reserve.
4  
This rather pessimistic view regarding the revenue prospects in established 
markets for NWFP is supported by various empirical observations. Homma (1992), 
                                                           
3 These municipalities form the so-called "assai belt" (Para state) and "babassu belt" (mainly Maranhao 
state).  
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analysing the historical development of extractive activities in the Amazon, characterises 
the dynamics of NWFP as an economic cycle composed by 4 phases: expansion, 
stabilisation, and decline of the extraction, followed by cultivated plantations. The 
expansion phase is characterised by the existence of large reserves of resource and by the 
monopolistic position of the extraction region in the product market. The stabilisation 
occurs when the market tends to equilibrium close to the maximum capacity of 
extraction. The decline starts with the reduction of the resource base and with the 
increase in the extraction costs. Finally, the domestication phase begins during the 
stabilisation phase as long as technological and substitution constraints are not high 
enough and the demand remains reasonably stable. This theory of a revenue cycle is also 
supported by more recent empirical evidence for current NWFP produced in extractive 
reserves, most strikingly in the case of rubber over the last ten years. Although rubber is 
still the main product of extractive reserves, its production has been constantly declining 
since their creation. The rubber production in Brazil started the 1990s with almost 25,000 
tons a year and finished the decade with less than 6,000 tons, facing a decline of more 
than 75 per cent (IBAMA, 2001). In addition, rubber plantations are increasing in other 
regions of Brazil, particularly in the state of Sao Paulo. Similar developments have been 
observed for nuts and other NWFP.  
Both the industrial analysis and the empirical evidence suggest that over a longer 
time horizon, extractive reserves are able to compete with plantations in the NFWP 
markets only under very restrictive conditions. According to Goeschl and Igliori (2003), 
these arise when (1) technology-induced cost savings in the NWFP industry are limited, 
(2) biological inputs are sufficiently expensive, and (3) there is spatial differentiation.  
 
Markets for New NWFP 
 
While the probability that extractive reserves can generate a long-run revenue 
stream in existing NWFP markets is limited, the empirical evidence points to temporary 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Apart from the threat of domestication in plantations, revenues from NWFP produced in reserves are 
limited by the availability of  substitutes. The substitution of natural products by synthetic ones can be 
triggered either by a shortage of supply or by technological advance.   
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monopolies for extractive reserves in early stages of the market. Particularly in rubber
5, 
but also more recently in various nuts, fruits and oils, it has been observed that the initial 
phases of the NWFP market generate significant profits (Homma, 1992). There are 
various reasons to believe that such transitory periods of abnormal profits will generally 
exist: (1) Competitors face fixed costs of market entry; (2) initial production costs for 
competitors may be higher while cost reduction will not occur instantaneously, and (3) 
the demand for products may be partly endogenous and hence initially clustered around 
the reserve where it enjoys a location advantage over competitors even when its unit costs 
are higher.  
This potential of a temporary monopoly in a specific NWFP market raises the 
possibility of a development pathway for extractive reserves that builds on the abundant 
biological capital available therein. If reserves are in a position to generate a sequence of 
novel NWFP, they are rewarded for this activity with a sequence of temporary 
monopolies in the markets for these new products. Whether this strategy is economically 
feasible depends on the returns to product search activities carried out in the reserve. Two 
factors need to be considered: One is the cost of product search carried out in the 
expectation of discovering a new NWFP with market potential; the other is the pool of 
potential products over which this search can be conducted. These factors will determine 
the returns to the search activity.  
 
Markets for Biological Inputs 
 
Additional to pursuing a strategy of product discovery, the inexpensive access to a 
biological capital allows for a third strategy available for extractive reserves. This is to 
supply the biological inputs that its plantation competitors will be demanding in order to 
control the cost function dynamics.  
A key variable is the price of biological capital. The plantation has a reservation 
price, which corresponds to the cost associated with setting up an enterprise to collect 
natural resources in the Amazon region. However the plantation can alternatively pay the 
price charged by the reserve to supply biological resources. If the latter is lower than the 
                                                           
5 It is sufficient here to mention the rubber boom in the late 19
th and early 20
th century.   
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former, there are incentives for the plantation to buy biological inputs from the reserve.  
It is not unreasonable to assume that this inequality will be fulfilled given the labour-
intensive production methods in the reserves. The methods allow those involved in the 
extractive activities to observe the traits of various tree varieties with respect to yield, 
disease resistance, quality of output etc. It is plausible, therefore, that extractive reserves 
will be able to identify characteristics valuable to plantations at a lower cost than a search 
process not relying on this prior information.  
From the reserve's point of view, the most attractive feature of the supply of 
biological inputs to competitors is that it establishes a negative link between the 
development of the reserve's share of the market for NWFP and the revenue generated by 
the sale of inputs into NWFP production. Goeschl and Igliori (2003) show that to the 
extent that reserves can supply these biological inputs, some mitigating compensation for 
the revenue loss on the NWFP market is available. 
 
3. Property Rights 
 
Property Rights within the Reserve 
 
Extractive reserves have an innovative and idiosyncratic internal property rights 
regime. It has a triple structure and can be seen as a co-management system involving the 
government, the community, and the individuals: 
(a) The state owns the land and regulates the exploitation of the resources, giving 
the concessions to the communities and approving a use plan, and monitoring its 
compliance.  
(b) The communities write the use plan, receive the long-term use concession of 
the natural resources, and are responsible for the full application and respect of the use-
plan. Communities also negotiate with the government the construction and management 
of health and education facilities in the reserves.  
(c) The exploitation of the resources is made within individual land plots 
(‘colocações’). Each household organizes his/her extraction activities and cultivation of  
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subsistence crops. Co-operation between households is more or less frequent depending 
on the particular case, but the results are privately appropriated. 
The external property right structure includes only the NWFP. The households 
can sell and fully appropriate the value of their production of extractive products. They 
cannot sell neither the land nor the use of exploiting the land. Diagram 1 illustrates the 
property rights structure in a typical extractive reserve. 
Rather than been a top-down measure elaborated within government's offices the 
creation of the extractive reserves were originally proposed by the rubber tappers 
themselves. Potentially, this fact contributes to the compliance with respect to the 
constraints in resource exploitation prescribed by the use plan. Boundary definition also 
contributes to avoid conflicts, as they are determined in accordance with the already 
established exploitation methods and geographic coverage. The communal design of the 
reserve boundary preserve access to all members of the community to natural resources 
such as rivers and lakes, and avoids cost with fencing. Communal facilities for storing 
and processing products can also be built without promoting disputes regarding land 
allocation. 
As mentioned above the ultimate economic incentive is allocated to the individual 
who will be benefiting from his/her own production. Thus, it is possible to say that the 
standard efficiency mechanisms associated with private property structures are present in 
the property design of the extractive reserves. Since members have no rights over the 
other members’ production there is no possibility for free riding and consumption 
possibilities are connected with individual efforts. One the other hand the households can 
benefit from collective initiatives to store, process, and market the products. 
In order to assess the possibilities of a community to cope with the challenges of 
managing local natural resources based on collective action, Ostrom (1990) has 
elaborated seven ‘design principles’ that characterize robust institutions, present in 
several cases of common property resources she studied. By ‘design principle’ she means 
‘an essential element or condition that helps to account for the success of these 
institutions in sustaining common property resources and gaining the compliance of 
generation after generation of appropriators of the rules in use’ (Ostrom, 1990, p.90). 
Table 1 presents the Ostrom’s principles.  
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In principle, extractive reserves have most of the necessary institutional 
characteristics, proposed by Ostrom in her design principles, to enhance the chances of a 
successful management of natural resource with an active role for the rural community:  
 
(a) Boundaries and population with use rights are clearly defined;  
(b) Although approved by the government, everyone involved in the 
community designs operational rules;  
(c) Monitors are the appropriators themselves; 
(d) There is an association, which is a local forum for conflict resolution. For 
more serious or complex problems there is also the National Council of Rubber 
Tappers, which congregates the associations of all reserves. The government also 
provides a institution structure which represents the communities called the National 
Centre for the Sustainable Development of Traditional Populations (CNPT) based on 
the Ministry of the Environment; 
(e) Governmental authorities do not challenge autonomous institutional 
building. On the contrary there is a number of initiatives, sponsored by the 
government and NGOs focused on governance and institution building within the 
extractive reserves.  
Overall therefore, the structure of property rights within reserves creates 
incentives that are compatible with a conservative use of the biological capital base and 
provides incentives for the extraction of a defined set of NWFP in the extractive reserves. 
This structure ensures that contributions from members of the community to the specific 
extractive activities in the reserves will be rewarded in congruence with the local 
production conditions.  
How well does this structure works with respect to contributions of members that 
are not related to the pre-defined set of NWFP? There is little evidence that the 
appropriation and provision rules reward two critical inputs required to access the 
development pathways of diversification and biological input supply. The critical input 
into accessing the pathway of diversification is search activity directed towards the 
discovery of new NWFP with revenue potential. However, as individuals in the reserves 
cannot exclude others within the reserve from benefiting potential discoveries, there are  
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few incentives for putting efforts in research and development activities. In addition, the 
human capital base formed by the traditional populations not necessarily aggregates the 
necessary expertise to carry out systematic research and product development.  
 
The critical input into biological input supply is knowledge about production-
relevant characteristics of the local biological capital stock. However, there is currently 
no mechanism to reward the information an individual has with respect to the biological 
characteristics, productive properties and resistance to diseases, the different varieties 
might have. Neither one of these inputs is therefore considered under the use plan or 
included in the quasi-contractual relationships between households and the wider 
community such as the ones that govern the benefit sharing over revenues from the 
marketing of NWFP.  
 
Property Rights in the Wider Economy 
 
A related, but separate issue is the property rights structure over the commercial 
outputs generated by the extractive reserve in the wider economy. One factor that 
supports the functioning of the property rights regimes within the reserve with respect to 
existing NWFP is the fact that the property rights over the output of the production 
system can be easily defined and are well established both within and outside the reserve. 
The reason is that the existing NWFP produced such as rubber and nuts have the classical 
characteristics of private goods: They are both excludable and rivalrous in consumption 
and protected by adequate legal titles.  
This rights structure over NWFP in the wider economy facilitates the definition of 
boundaries and helps ensure congruence between input provision and share of benefits 
from the output within the reserve. However, with respect to the discovery of new 
marketable NWFP and the supply of biological inputs, the property rights structure in the 
wider economy is less supportive. In the case of discovery, since the search procedure 
does not involve the ‘creation’ of a novel product, extractive reserves are not protected 
from imitating companies. However, the property rights in the new NWFP itself are again 
compatible with rewarding inputs. This contrasts with the case of biological inputs.  
  13
Although the Convention of Biological Diversity has motivated systematic discussions 
about legislative proposals aiming to protect indigenous rights related to biological 
diversity, the property rights over biological inputs and most importantly over genetic 
resources are currently in the public domain
6. This means that no property rights in the 
local biological capital are assigned to the community living in the reserve. The obvious 
consequence is that the supply of biological inputs in a narrow sense cannot generate 





Theoretical and empirical studies indicate that pure property rights arrangements 
(open space, common property, private property, public property) cannot generally 
guarantee efficient management of natural resources. Therefore they call the attention for 
case-by case analysis and suggests that co-managed structures might offer alternatives for 
balancing the development-conservation trade-off.  
Extractive reserves combines public, common and private property rights with the 
aim of providing incentives for achieving the joint objective of biodiversity conservation 
and economic development for populations selling NWFP in a market economy without 
converting the designated forested areas. The analysis presented in this paper suggests 
that the current set of property rights in extractive reserves is primarily based around the 
continued extraction of established NWFP. Within this narrow domain, the property 
rights structure represents a very effective response to the competing objectives of 
conservation and income generation.  
However, considering a wider choice of development pathways, the adequacy of 
the current property rights structure is less apparent: Rewarding contributions to an 
expansion of products that the community markets is conducive to a pathway directed 
towards diversification. Likewise, rewarding the supply of biological inputs and 
knowledge about the characteristics of these inputs contributes to a development process 
built around biological input supply. The current property structure both within and 
                                                           
6 See Dutfield (2000) and Arcanjo (2000)  
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outside the reserves presents considerable deficiencies to provide incentives for these two 
possibilities of turning the extractive reserves economically viable. Table 2 summarises 
the contribution of the property right structures within the reserve and external to the 
reserve with respect to the three development pathways discussed in the paper. 
We can see that only the currently pursued development pathway, which relies on 
the extraction of existing NWFP, is fully supported by the property rights, both internally 
and externally. A strategy involving diversification is discouraged by a lack of rewards 
for the input supporting that strategy, specifically the activity of product search, but has 
partial support in that the new NWFP themselves are covered by the current property 
rights over outputs. Lastly, the pathway involving the supply of biological inputs is 
supported neither by rights over input nor over outputs.  
This finding is problematic when set into the context of section 2: The current 
property rights structure encourages the reliance on only one of the three possible 
pathways. This limits the width of the revenue base at any given point in time on which 
economic development of the extractive reserve could be based. Over time, this limitation 
is even more problematic since the analytical and empirical evidence suggest that 
revenues from existing NWFP production will be maintained only under very restricted 
conditions. The current property rights regime also contains features that in themselves 
undermine the development objective of the extractive reserves. One example is that 
because no functioning property rights exist for biological inputs at the same time as the 
government conserves biological capital on public land (notably extractive reserves), 
plantations benefit from an inexpensive supply of these essential inputs into NWFP 
production. This reduces plantations' expenses for inputs, enabling them to compete even 
more effectively with extractive reserves on the NWFP markets that are supposed to 
generate the revenues to develop reserves economically. In such cases, the conservation 
and development objectives are clearly in conflict and require adjustment.  
These rather discouraging conclusions raise questions regarding the challenges 
ahead the extractive reserves. Firstly, as the difficulties regarding the establishment of 
property rights over biological capital evidenced by the discussions in the Brazilian 
congress might suggest, it is not clear whether property rights can be changed to enhance 
the chances of extractive reserves to survive in the long run. Moreover, confronting  
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previous studies with the case of extractive reserves we see the limitations of assigning 
property rights for solving efficiency problems of natural resources management. 
Particularly, when communities operating a constrained production system must compete 
with unconstrained firms in a market economy. Then, the dynamic processes of product 
discovery and the creation of markets for biological inputs set in a broader context must 
be taken into account, which go beyond the static context of mixed property rights 
assigned to extractive reserves. These questions conform a fundamental contradiction 
posed by the static nature of property rights in the reserve as opposed to the economic 
dynamics of competition to the outside world. As the property rights structure in 
extractive reserves was based on the previously established extraction system exploited 
by the rubber tappers, it not contemplate the necessary features the two other more 





The instrument of extractive reserves has been advertised as a novel approach to 
reconciling biodiversity conservation and economic development. It is on the basis of this 
claim that their number and size is currently undergoing expansion in the Brazilian 
Amazon. 
In this paper, we characterise the peculiar production conditions for NWFP that 
exist in extractive reserves and assess the development pathways that these conditions 
offer to the communities living there. These pathways are the marketing of existing 
NWFP, the diversification into new NWFP and supply of biological inputs to other 
NWFP producing companies. The pathways are then set against the current property 
rights structure within the reserves and in the wider economy. The extractive reserves in 
the Brazilian Amazon have an innovative structure of property rights combining elements 
of public, communal and private ownership and use rights. As the literature on property 
rights indicates, this idiosyncratic combination seems to produce the appropriate 
incentives for efficient conservation and economic exploitation of existing NWFP. 
However, the analytical and empirical evidence suggests that the revenue potential in  
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existing NWFP is very limited. On the other hand, the existing property rights structure 
does not facilitate accessing the remaining two development pathways. The difficulties 
involving significant changes in the current set of property rights particularly with 
regards to the wider economy anticipate considerable challenges for fulfilling the 
development objectives of extractive reserves in the future. This problematic conclusion 
points out that policies aiming to enable traditional communities to undertake long-run 
development must take into account the relationship they ultimately have with 
competitors outside they internal remit. It also indicates the need for further research on 
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Table 1 Design Principles Illustrated by Long-enduring CPR Institutions 
1. Clearly defined boundaries. Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw 
resource units from CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR 
itself. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions. 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units 
are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or 
money. 
3. Collective choice arrangements. Most individuals affected by the operational rules can 
participate in modifying the operational rules. 
4. Monitoring. Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, 
are accountable to appropriators or are the appropriators. 
5. Graduated sanctions. Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be 
assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) 
by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or both. 
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms. Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to 
low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators 
and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize. The rights of appropriators to devise their 
own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities. 
Source: Ostrom (1990, p.90) 
  
 
Table 2. Contribution of Property Rights to Development Pathways 
 






Biological Input Supply 
Internal effective  Deficient  Deficient 
External effective  effective/deficient  Deficient 
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